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THE SMART BORDER: FOOD SAFETY AND BIOTERRORISM
Barry Kellmant
U.S. Speaker
Good morning. Thank you very much for the introduction. Thank you,
Professor King, for inviting me to speak to you this morning. The fact that I
have to speak to you about a topic like biological terrorism and the fact that
you have come out on a beautiful Saturday morning to talk about a topic of
bioterrorism suggests something rather despicable about humanity.
Disease does a perfectly good job of figuring out new and innovative
techniques for killing us. We see that most recently in the SARS epidemic.'
The fact that human beings would use disease for some political end, would
inflict disease contagion in order to kill thousands, tens of thousands, perhaps
hundreds of thousands of people, suggests in light of our history's speeches,
something truly despicable in the human character.2 It is a tragedy that we
have to be spending our time dealing with this problem. But we do have to
deal with this problem at a completely different kind of level, a political
level. What is happening with bioterrorism suggests something not as
despicable, but something problematic.
Are there meetings going on, not in Cleveland, Ohio, but in the capitals of
the world to develop strategies for how to deal with biological terrorism? Is
this an agenda item front and center of President Bush and the Prime
Ministers of other western countries? Are there international proposals for
new and innovative ways to deal with this threat? If there are, I do not know
of them. I have been working in this area for a long time. I think that alone
I Barry Kellman is a Professor of Law and serves as Director of the International
Weapons Control Center at the DePaul University College of Law. He has served as legal
adviser to the National Commission on Terrorism in 2000 and currently chairs the ABA
Committee on Law and International Security and the Arms Control Section of the American
Society of International Law. In addition to his work on bioterrorism, he is a legal authority on
the Chemical Weapons Convention as lead author of the Manualfor National Implementation
of the Chemical Weapons Convention, and has served as consultant to the Department of
Defense on issues relating to the legal implementation of the Convention, the Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty, and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Professor Kellman received his
B.A. from the University of Chicago and a J.D. from Yale University.
1 Jeffrey Kluger, Killer pneumonia, TIME (Can. Ed.) Vol. 161, Issue 13, March 31, 2003,
availableat 2003 WL 11985539.
2 Derrick DePledge, Big question remains: Will Saddam use weapons of mass
destruction?,GANNETr NEWS SERV., March 30, 2003, availableat 2003 WL 5600279.
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says something rather unfortunate about the political condition at the
beginning of the 21 st century. What are we talking about? Let me just run
through a bit of details, not in any great specificity, but just to get some
context.
POSSIBILITY OF TERRORISTS USING DISEASE AGENTS
Anthrax
The disease agent that most people talk about is Anthrax. Anthrax is a
spore. For our purposes what that means is that it is not contagious. One
inhales it, ingests it, or can get it through the skin. Inhaling is much worse
than ingesting it or skin contact with spores. It multiplies within the system
and kills within a matter of days. It is a rather horrible death. If I have it, it
does not mean you are going to get it at all. It is, however, a remarkably
effective mass destruction weapon if used in certain ways.
What happened a year and a half ago with the Anthrax on letters was
really kind of an amazing story because the Anthrax that was being used was
of a remarkably high grade.3 From a terrorist's perspective it was about the
best stuff you can get. Yet the dissemination method that was chosen,
putting it on envelopes, was about as pedestrian as you can get. You have to
sit back and wonder who could get, who could develop, and who could
obtain this remarkably fine Anthrax powder, and then not think about ways
to use it far more effectively. Do not get me wrong, I am glad he did not, but
there is a quandary here that should be thought about. There are scenarios,
almost all involving inside distribution. Outside, Anthrax falls to the ground,
which is not very effective as a terrorist device. But when it is distributed
through air filtration systems, there are some scenarios, for example, sports
stadiums, entertainment venues, etc., where it is possible to think about
casualties in the tens of thousands; perhaps hundreds of thousands.
Plague
The other agent that some people talk about quite a bit is plague. 4 If I
were a terrorist, this would probably be my choice. Plague is readily
contagious. It is easily treatable if one catches it early and essentially
3 See, FBI Doesn't Know How Many Labs Are Capable of Making Bacteria, ASIAN WALL
Nov. 8,2001, at 13, available at 2001 WL-WSJA 29656640; Officials doubt
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anthrax started at military lab,
WL 24536739.
4 Plague,
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inundates the victim with antidotes. That said, if we are talking about a case
or two or five or ten, there is really no question about the medical system's
ability to cope with that situation. If, however, we get a deliberate terrorist
outbreak, we are talking about 1,000 cases, 5,000 cases, 10,000 cases, we run
into the possibility that the medical system will simply be overwhelmed.
That it will not be able to contain that. As I said, plague is highly contagious.
Small Pox
The third agent that we talk about, and the one that you know most about,
and the one that is by any measure off the spectrum is small pox. 5 If we drew
a spectrum of all the disease agents in terms of what kind of a threat they
pose, smallpox would be way over here. It would be way off the spectrum.
In one of humanity's greatest accomplishments, we eradicated smallpox from
human existence leaving only two samples
at the Center for Disease Control
6
Moscow.
in
laboratory
a
at
and
Atlanta
in
Smallpox is by far the deadliest killer in human history. It is responsible
for 300 million deaths in the 2 0 'h Century. Compare that to Hitler and Stalin,
who by some estimates were responsible for 20 percent of that. We are
talking about a killer of unimaginable proportions. We do not know if
smallpox is out there. A lot of people say that they think it is. There is a lot
of evidence to indicate that it might be. Strangely, there have been no
outbreaks of smallpox. If there smallpox out there, and if we are not
properly vaccinated, we are looking at a crisis truly of unparalleled
proportions.
Simply stated, somebody can infect themselves, walk through a line at
Chicago's O'Hare Airport, walk around in the crowds and it would then
spread to the people he or she would come in contact with. Remember the
disease is remarkably contagious. Once contaminated these people would get
on planes. They would be contagious. We would have a global outbreak in
no time.
Flu
Let me talk to you about the flu. Flu sounds almost benign, does it not?
Twenty-thousand people die in the United States every year due to flu, but
they are mainly people who are either very elderly or sick anyway.7 We
5 Small Pox Overview, Fact Sheet, CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL, Dec. 9, 2002,
available at www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/smallpox/overview/overview.pdf
6 Small Pox and Bioterrorism, Fact Sheet, CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL, April 6, 2001,

available at www.bt.cdc.gov/Agent/Smallpox/FactSheet.pdf
7 Flu bioweapon fears: Flu could be a far more dangerous bioterror weapon than
smallpox or anthrax, scientists have warned, BBC NEWS, July 1, 2003, available at
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know how contagious it is, but we tend to not think of it as a mass
destruction weapon. 8 We should say that single the most deadly event of the
9
2 0 th Century was the 1918 Spanish flu outbreak.
What will it take to recreate the Spanish flu in a laboratory? We cannot
do that right now, but we are very, very close. The prospects of
bio-engineered flu are within reach, meaning three to ten years. We are not
talking a long time. We are talking about something that is remarkably
contagious by and large, not remarkably deadly, but which can be adjusted
through genetic engineering techniques posing what I think is the worst
possible combination of pathogenicity and contagion.
Access to and Distribution of Disease Agents
That leads us to talk about where the vectors are pointing. I have got to
tell you that the vectors are all pointing in the wrong direction. If I had to
vote, I would say that no single discipline has contributed as much to human
welfare as has biological science. Those very capabilities that are creating the
kinds of breakthroughs that we all read about on a daily basis, those very
capabilities are capabilities that could be used for remarkably destructive
consequences. As those capabilities grow, the ability to make deadly
biological weapons grows accordingly.
I do not mean to malign the biological profession, the life sciences. We
are talking about one in 10,000, one in 100,000, one in a million, some
astoundingly low percentage of those who have this capability to direct such
knowledge towards wrongful ends. As those capabilities become more
powerful, the facility for using them becomes more readily available.
Therefore, it forces us to think about how we prevent that kind of action from
taking place.
With all due respect to the chair, I think we are doing a rather remarkably
poor job in dealing with this threat. What do we have to be talking about?
We have to be talking about, first of all, denying capabilities to biological
terrorists.10 The one piece of good news that I have for you this morning is
that it is not as easy to carryout biological terrorism as you read in the
newspapers. If we talk about biological terrorism in terms of spreading
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/3031488.stm
8 The Common Flu -- or Bioterrorism?Institute Of Human Virology Works On A Rapid
Diagnostic Tool To Help Answer The Question, SCIENCE DAILY, Sept. 3, 2002, available at
www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2002/09/020903071914.htm
9 William Hathaway, Flu's Clues; Scientists in Meriden Racing to Crack Code of a Killer,
HARTFORD COURANT, Dec. 6, 1998, at Al; Jack Fincher, America's Deadly Rendezvous with
the "Spanish Lady," SMITHSONIAN MAG., Jan. 1989, at 130.

10 See, Lawrence 0. Gostin, The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act: Public
Health and Civil Liberties in a Time of Terrorism, 13 HEALTH MATRIX 3 (2003).
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Salmonella in a salad bar or something like that it is pretty easy. Whe you are
speaking in terms of a mass destruction weapon, it is actually pretty hard to
carryout. You have to have or secure access to a remarkably good
laboratory." The person with access has to have real skills, real capabilities,
and the materials.
You can scrape Anthrax from a dead animal, but you do not have
something that is very usable as a weapon. Plague is available throughout
the southwest if you know how to get it. However, it is not very readily
usable as a weapon. To weaponize it is hard. 12 Thank goodness, that is true.
You have to get access to a pretty sophisticated laboratory to make it
worthwhile. That gives us the first indication of how to deal with this. We
have to be talking about instituting very rigorous controls over laboratories.
We have to be talking about instituting very rigorous controls over the
pathogens themselves.
Do you know that until 1995 in the United States, you could order plague
through the mail? You could say, "Excuse me, I would like some plague
virus." With that simple request, you could get plague sent to you through
the mail. 13 When Larry Wayne Harris, a Neo-Nazi character, ordered plague
through the mail it started some people in Congress thinking maybe we ought
to tighten this up. 14 In a way, maybe we should thank him, because we did
tighten it up. 15 We set up a registration system where you can only get these
kinds of pathogens if you are registered and you have legitimate purposes for
them. That is excellent.
On the other side you can only provide them if you are similarly
registered. So in order to get a legitimate stockpile of these kinds of

1 William Broad and Judith Miller, Anthrax Inquiry Looks at U.S. Labs, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
2,2001.
12 Steve Bowman, Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Terrorist Threat, CONGRESSIONAL
SERVICE REPORT FOR CONGRESS, March 7, 2002, at 5, available at
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/91 84.pdf
13 Statement of Cynthia A. Bascetta before Before the Subcommittee on National Security,
Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of
Representatives, Combating Terrorism: Chemical and Biological Medical Supplies Are Poorly
Managed, UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, March 8, 2000, available at
www.gao.gov/archive/2000/h 100059t.pdf
14 Jonathan B Tucker, Preventing the misuse of pathogens: The needfor global
biosecurity standards, ARMS CONT. TODAY, June 1, 2003, at 310, available at
2003 WL 16228425; Testimony of Stephen Ostroff before the U.S. House of
Representatives Committee on Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations,
CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, May 20,
1999, available at
www.bt.cdc.gov/press/Ostroff 05201999.asp
15 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, PUB. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214 (1996), Sec. 511.
RESEARCH
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pathogens, the provider has to be registered and the receiver has to be
registered. That is excellent.
Assume for a minute that I am a registered facility. I represent a
registered facility and I have these kinds of viruses. You represent a
registered facility that wants access to these kinds of pathogens. Both of us
are completely legitimate enterprises engaged in legitimate research with no
terrorist motivation whatsoever. We place this request and we file it with the
Center for Disease Control. It is approved and everything is proper. I send
you the plague virus in a vial. How does that get to you? Amazingly, it
arrives via Fed Ex.
We have still got a problem. The problem is not with me. The problem is
not with you. The problem is with the possibility of diversion along the way.
The problem is with the lack of security along the way. Multiply this out on
the international spectrum to address shipping viruses globally. When
shipping globally, the packages usually travel by air. What security measures
being taken to make sure that there is not a perfume vial containing
pathogens on a ship or on a plane? Do we have that capability to even figure
it out?
Let me back that question up a little bit. Say the whole idea here is law
enforcement, right? That is what we are talking about, whether we are
talking about regulating laboratories or regulating transport. What we are
really talking about is figuring out ways to identify who are the bad guys and
stop them from gaining access to the pathogens. We want to stop them from
moving the pathogens, from developing the pathogens, from having a
weapon, and from using a weapon. We need active law enforcement from
customs to regulate and to police this. I think everyone accepts that.
Did you know that with the exception of about ten countries including the
U.S. and Canada, it is perfectly legal in virtually every country in this world
to make a biological weapon? There is no law that prohibits somebody from
making a biological weapon. Yes, there is a law that prohibits you from
using a biological weapon. It is called homicide. Making a biological weapon
is different.
In most parts of the world making a biological weapon is
perfectly legal. What does this mean? It means that law enforcement has no
authority whatsoever to conduct an investigation to try to prohibit somebody
from doing that. Law enforcement in every nation is dedicated to preventing
illegal behavior, not to preventing legal behavior. Until we have a law that
penalizes the preliminary steps to the preparation of a biological weapon, we
cannot engage law enforcement. We cannot engage customs. We cannot
engage the regulatory capabilities to try to help prevent this act from taking
place.
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NEED FOR A INTERNATIONAL APPROACH
That leads to the most important point. If there is a development of a
biological weapon in any part of the world, it will soon be in every part of the
world. The notion that we can build a wall around the United States, or that
together we can build a wall around North America, is patently absurd.
Disease does not need a passport. It does not need to get a stamp as it moves
across the border. It has absolutely no respect for borders whatsoever. With
modem air travel, disease can move literally from anyplace in the world to
anyplace in the world at a moment's notice. Certainly, if the disease is a
result of deliberate terrorist activity that is precisely what will happen.
If a disease agent is made into a weapon in a place where there is no
prohibition against that kind of activity, even the best U.S. laws, even the
best Canadian laws will simply be ineffective in stopping that disease from
coming on to our shores. If there is any situation that humanity faces in this
day and age that forces us to say we share a planet, this is the problem. Tony
Blair says we are all internationalists whether we like it or not. I think that
line is underlined by the threat of biological terrorism.
When we talk about regulation of biological laboratories, we have to be
talking about setting up a global system of regulating biological laboratories.
When we talk about regulating pathogens, access to those pathogens,
registering those individuals that can legitimately deal with them, we have to
be talking about that kind of a system at an international level. When we talk
about customs controls to at least begin to counteract the smuggling of
pathogens across national boundaries, we have to be talking about the
development of an international system. When we talk about identifying
anomalous behavior so that Police are authorized to conduct investigations,
we have to be talking about developing an international system. When we
talk about collecting information into sophisticated databases in order to
understand the movement of biology, who is doing what with what
pathogens, we have to be talking about information at the international 6 level,
processed at the international level, and used at the international level.1
The international approach is not because of ideology, but simply because
of the nature of the problem. That is the real point of talking about this at a
Canadian-U.S. Institute meeting this morning. The planet is obviously not
represented here, but it is one microcosm. If you will, this is one example of
the capabilities for bilateral and hopefully multilateral cooperation. We have
to take this discussion to a new level. We have to think about how we
regulate this discipline that has had such incredible benefits for humankind,
while at the same time preventing that discipline from being misused. We
16 Michael Crowley, Combating Biological Weapons, U.N. CHRONICLE, 2002, available at

www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/2002/issue2/0202p73_combating-biological-weapons.html
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have to think about the civil liberty implications. I am talking about
international law enforcement. We have to talk about the economic
consequences of the distribution of vaccines, pharmaceuticals, and antidotes.
We have to do this all on an international level. The bad news is that as of
April 11, 2003 that discussion is not even beginning. Thank you very much.

